Game Theory Homework | College Homework Help

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    Game Theory Homework | College Homework Help

    1. Consider a “divide four objects game” in which player 1 proposes a division scheme ((4,0), (3,1), (2,2), (1,3) or (0,4)) and player 2 either accepts it or rejects. In the former case, the proposed division takes place and in the latter both players get nothing. a) Find the number of different pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. b) Find the number of SPE among these Nash equilibria. 2. Two players are engaged in a infinitely repeated game whose stage game is shown below. L R U 5,5 1,2 D 6,2 2,4 a) Find all feasible individually rational payoffs. b) Is payoff (5,5) possible in an SPE (assuming _ is sufficiently large)? Why? c) Can you suggest a simple trigger strategy achieving payoff (5,5)? (Hint: find NE

    1. Consider a “divide four objects game” in which player 1 proposes a division scheme ((4,0),
    (3,1), (2,2), (1,3) or (0,4)) and player 2 either accepts it or rejects. In the former case, the
    proposed division takes place and in the latter both players get nothing.
    a) Find the number of different pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game.
    b) Find the number of SPE among these Nash equilibria.
    2. Two players are engaged in a infinitely repeated game whose stage game is shown below.

    L R
    U 5,5 1,2
    D 6,2 2,4

    a) Find all feasible individually rational payoffs.
    b) Is payoff (5,5) possible in an SPE (assuming _ is sufficiently large)? Why?
    c) Can you suggest a simple trigger strategy achieving payoff (5,5)? (Hint: find NE of
    the stage game and recall the weak perfect folk theorem.)
    d) What is the smallest value of _ making this simple trigger strategy possible?
    3. Consider a modified public good game between four players in which for the public good
    to be available at least two players out of the four have to contribute. If the public good
    is available each player gets a payoff of 1 from it. The cost of contributing for player i is
    equal to ci. Each player knows his or her own cost and has incomplete information about
    the other players costs believing that the cost of each opponent is uniformly distributed on
    the interval [0; 1] independently of each other. Find all symmetric PBE of this game.
    4. In a multi-period chain store game with 30 cities, the payoffs of all players are just like
    described in class with a = 2 and b = 0:5.
    a) Suppose the local store in city 2 (counting from the end) was the first to enter in a
    PBE. What is the possible range of the parameter pc in this problem?
    b) What is the expected payoff of the chain store in this game?
    c) What is the expected payoff of the local store in city 2?